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The question of how the substance of politics helps shape legislative coalitions and bases of 
support has been displaced from the center of studies of Congress since the publication of 
pioneering work in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Seeking to revive this research program, we apply 
an original coding scheme in tandem with a factor analytic analysis of voting and policy space to 
the period spanning the last years of the Hoover presidency to the start of Eisenhower’s. 
Investigating legislator parameters—the dimensions of voting space—and roll call parameters—
the dimensions of policy space—the paper confirms the strong independent impact of the 
substance of policy on the political decisions of legislators and reveals an issue-specific 
concatenation of party and region that altered over the course of the period. 
 







As systematic behavioral studies of Congress hit their stride in the 1960s and 1970s, the question 
of how policy makes politics promised to produce fruitful links joining realistic analytical 
accounts of the substance of American politics to richly-textured narrative histories and to central 
questions raised by political theorists about representation in liberal and democratic theory.  
Pioneering work by Lowi (1964, 1970, 1972) and Mayhew (1966) complemented earlier studies 
on party and regional bases of roll call behavior (Turner 1970 [1950]) to consider how variation 
in clusters of policies under consideration in Congress affected the choices and partisanship of its 
members.   
Asking how farm issues, urban questions, labor concerns, and Western regional matters 
distinguished roll call behavior, shaped voting blocs, defined coalitions, and facilitated 
understanding of the two major parties, Mayhew’s first book probed how the content of public 
policy, understood in terms familiar to the politicians themselves, influenced outcomes and 
explained variation in a compressed historical period spanning 1947 to 1962.  He discovered 
important variations characterizing different issues and parties and appealed to constituency 
characteristics and the abilities of the parties to forge inclusive coalitions as key factors shaping 
member behavior.   
Concurrently, Lowi began to publish a series of articles taking up the same theme of discerning 
the determination of politics by policy.  By contrast to Mayhew’s self-consciously limited scope 
of time, issue choice, roll call selection, and theoretical claim—his book was situated as a probe 
of how substance and history might matter—Lowi aimed at a vastly more ambitious and inclusive 
project, that of a parsimonious classification of policy arenas (first characterized famously as 
distributive, regulatory, and redistributive) capable of defining ‘arenas of power’ and placing a 
vast array of case studies across American politics in time.  Each type of issue, he hypothesized, 
elicits different definitions of interest, different relations among interests, and different relations 
between interests and government.  On this basis, he generated a deductive typology projecting 
outcomes from types of policy with respect to units of action (individuals, groups, associations), 
types of relations among units (log-rolling, coalitions, peak associations and social classes), 
structures of power (non-conflictual, pluralistic, and conflictual), as well predictions as relative 
stability, loci of decision, and patterns of implementation.  For Lowi, politics made policy in the 
most comprehensive manner.   
Neither of these two early initiatives or the lines of research they advocated moved ahead quite as 
robustly as these authors had hoped or we, in retrospect, would have wished.  Mayhew soon went 
on to address other themes, not least member rationality and the electoral connection (1974), 
returning later to issues of substance in the context of assessing legislative significance and the 
impact of divided government.  The mantle of his Party Loyalty was taken up primarily by 
Clausen (1973; Clausen and Cheney 19701) and Sinclair (1978,1982) who applied Clausen’s 
influential coding scheme to probe how member behavior varied across its categories.  Hampered 
in part by the level of aggregation of this classification, a subject to which we return, and in part 
by largely descriptive objectives, this line of analysis soon petered out.  So, too, did Lowi’s 
promised research program, at least in its most programmatic and systematic incarnations, 
arguably for similar reasons concerning coding.  If Clausen’s categorization suffered from too 
few ‘ordinary language’ types, lumping where splitting was needed, Lowi’s far more abstract 
scheme proved very difficult to operationalize crisply.  Today, this body of work about the impact 
                                                 





of policy substance on congressional behavior is relatively dormant.  Though we now understand 
a good deal about how voting, opinion, lobbying, and other forms of participation shape 
outcomes with determinate contours and content. (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989; 
Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), we know rather less about reciprocal causation.  In the 
main, scholars of Congress have turned to other subjects, including the electoral connection, the 
role of information, gridlock and divided government, delegation, and institutional change.   
We should like to revivify the lineage of inquiry that asks whether and how the substance of 
policy issues shapes behavior by representatives and thus how alterations to the policy agenda 
shape patterns of partisan and regional representation.  The questions this tradition of scholarship 
forcefully asked a generation ago are too important descriptively, theoretically, and analytically to 
leave out of consideration today.  Indeed, the challenges Lowi posed still stand: to find a way of 
coding policy “to suggest generalizations sufficiently close to the data to be relevant and 
sufficiently abstract to be subject to more broadly theoretical treatment,” and to probe, via such 
an approach, how “a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for 
every policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship.” (Lowi 1964: 688)    
For all the gains produced by the past quarter-century of congressional studies, this research 
agenda concerning the place of policy in history continues to remain elusive.  Earlier work on the 
substance of congressional behavior reached an impasse because it could not surmount the limits 
imposed on empirical analysis by bulky classification schemes.  Later work lost interest in the 
policy makes politics question for more fundamental reasons.  Poole and Rosenthal’s history of 
roll-call voting (1997), as a leading instance, mainly skips over the policy makes politics question 
despite its inductive coding scheme with 99 categories.  Their immense achievement giving us 
purchase on the content of the issue space as gauged in many thousands of roll calls over the long 
haul of American history, suggests that these concerns belong on the periphery of congressional 
studies.  For if a single ideological dimension defined by strong loyalty to one of two main 
political parties has been the central and nearly unwavering hallmark of congressional behavior 
irrespective of policy content across the full range of American history, then it makes little sense 
to ask how different policy arenas convene dissimilar patterns of partisanship and choice.  The 
book’s strategy of aggregating roll calls has the effect of highlighting and discovering similarities 
despite differences rather than the reverse.  Their concern to demonstrate the power of a low-, 
usually one-, dimensional spatial model to account for roll call voting tends to obscure 
differences across policy domains.  And when they tackle specific policy issues like the minimum 
wage or interstate commerce they tend to do so one issue at a time outside of the ken of any 
approach to classification.  Moreover, on the basis of a close look at the 95th House they explicitly 
reject Clausen’s argument that congressional voting can be parsed into five substantive policy 
arenas, finding that, empirically, his categories “represent highly related, not distinct, 
dimensions.” (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 56)  Though their test is confined to one brief moment 
and limited by Clausen’s coding, Poole and Rosenthal reinforce their one-dimensional portrait by 
concluding that different policy issues do not produce variety in member behavior.  
This paper confronts both roadblocks.  As every student of policy in Congress knows, appropriate 
coding is the sine qua non for linking substantive policies to the behavior of members.  We apply 
an original coding scheme that is far more fine-grained than prior attempts to classify 
congressional roll calls in order to interpret policy space in a way not possible in the past because 
of a lack of knowledge about, or attention to, the policy content of individual roll call votes.  
Utilizing this new tool, we return to themes central both to the older ‘policy makes politics’ 
literature and more recent concerns with the issue of dimensionality by mapping the substantive 
content of policy space in a more nuanced, precise, and historically-specific manner.  In so doing, 




Heckman and Snyder (1997) who question the vision of single-vector politics on the basis of their 
analysis of the post World War II period, finding that “at least five and perhaps as many as eight 
attributes are required to rationalize congressional voting patterns” when a search is mounted for 
specific policy issues in which more than one dimension is required to account robustly for roll 
call voting.  This discovery led them to conclude that a multidimensional framework is essential 
to predict votes in specific policy domains, including defense, agriculture, abortion, and civil 
rights.2 (Heckman and Snyder 1997: 145, 160, 176-180)   
It did not escape Poole and Rosenthal’s notice that at some (in their view, atypical) historical 
moments, a second dimension differentiating members by region helps to account for roll call 
behavior.  During the Civil War and Reconstruction, they observe, votes on slavery and civil 
rights were structured highly on the first dimension since issues of race and section defined party 
differences.  This overlap continued through the anti-lynching debates of the early 1920s.  But in 
the 1940’s, beginning with the 80th Congress, a second dimension began to differentiate 
southerners from nonsoutherners on civil rights votes, a pattern they attribute “to the emergence 
of a three-party system in the late 1930s—nonsouthern Democrats, southern Democrats, 
Republicans—brought about by race.” (Poole and Rosenthal 1997:110, 46)   
If grudging and cramped, this discussion by Poole and Rosenthal also is suggestive.  As they 
recognize, the Roosevelt-Truman years, the domain we have chosen for this probe, were pivotal 
for just these questions.  Yet, curiously, their work, like the massive scholarship by historians on 
this period of Democratic party hegemony and its strange bedfellows coalition of north and south 
(Leuchtenburg 1963; Brinkley 1995; Kennedy 1999), tends to treat regional questions only when 
civil rights issues themselves come up.  Otherwise, they consider the legislative enactments of 
New Deal as the product of a simple one-dimensional issue space.  This standard story, we will 
see, is incomplete.   
                                                 
2 This debate about dimensionality bears directly on long-vexing issues in the history of American political 
culture, especially as they pivot on Hartz’s famous claim that Lockean political liberalism has structured a 
one-dimensional issue space from the Founding onward.  By contrast, Smith recently has counterposed a 
‘multiple traditions’ approach to American political culture stressing the quasi-independent influence of 
ascriptive racism, thus calling into question whether liberalism, understood as Hartz did, actually has 
served as the singular master theme of American political culture and ideas. (Smith 1997)  Building on 
Tocqueville, Hartz had underscored the importance of the absence of feudalism and an ancien regime, 
treating political liberalism as so uncontested as to appear as a fact of nature.  Racial hierarchy and 
oppression, as Gunnar Myrdal stressed in his classic An American Dilemma (1944), might contradict its 
central values, but America’s liberal creed grounded in Enlightenment values of reason and regard for the 
human individual, he, too, believed to be secure atop the country’s value hierarchy.  Focusing on the 
interpretation of statutes by the federal judiciary, Smith demonstrates the enduring power of racial 
illiberalism, concluding that a “bitter blend” of liberalism and racism is the key to understanding American 
political thought and practice.  (Smith 1997: 104)  Smith’s analysis of jurisprudence effectively upbraids 
Hartz effectively for his neglect of racism, but the absence of congressional analysis in Smith’s work exacts 
a price. As the site of representation, the national legislature, after all, is American democracy’s most 
liberal site.  Not surprisingly, it was in Congress that deliberations at least as noteworthy as those in the 
courts have been undertaken to define the properties, contours, limits, and advances of American liberalism 
and its relationship to race and region.  In Congress, where legislative compromise almost always is 
necessary, historically-specific resolutions to the terms of connection between liberalism and racism, were 
developed within the embrace of liberal rules of representation and governance.  It is such negotiated 
settlements in specific policy areas we wish to understand better and with a degree of precision not yet 





To more fully come to grips with these questions, we extend the debate on policy, politics, and 
dimensionality back to the defining moment in American political history spanning the last years 
of the Hoover presidency to the start of Eisenhower’s.  Working within a temporal framework 
that cuts across the pre- and post-1945 divide characteristic of congressional studies, we extend 
the range of empirical evidence available to assess considerations of issue and voting space, but 
without any a priori expectation that the patterns we discover will be replicated in different 
historical epochs.  Indeed, a central thrust of our orientation is to underscore the historicity of 
politics by showing how both historical changes on a large scale and variations to the substance 
of policy under consideration in distinct epochs matter deeply.  The extended New Deal era is a 
particularly appealing research site to probe these matters.  Though it is intrinsically important to 
American political history, we know very little about policy and congressional behavior at this 
key juncture.  Not just scholarship by political scientists, but the massive body of work by 
historians on this period has focused very little on this subject matter; even the best historical 
work on such themes as the emergence of a conservative coalition of Republicans and southern 
Democrats (Patterson 1966; Patterson 1967; Porter 1980; Young 1956) tends to be written in 
narrative form, bill by bill, about a limited number of congresses, rendering their conclusions 
difficult to assay or confirm.  This period also is an important moment to explore disputes about 
the dimensionality of issue space.  This time of immense challenge and policy innovation was 
marked by strong party and ideological polarization, giving us strong reasons to expect 
confirmation of the one-dimensional view.  Yet this era also encompassed the last decades of the 
system V.O. Key (1949) described in Southern Politics in which a wholly distinct southern 
electoral system sent ‘solid south’ Democratic representatives to Congress who made 
guardianship of the ‘southern way of life’ a high, often highest, priority.  Therefore, it also is 
reasonable to expect a second dimension based on region and inscribed by race to play a key role 
in structuring member behavior.  But when and under what conditions it might do so is not 
obvious.   
Taking this era as our site of inquiry and applying our new coding scheme in tandem with a factor 
analytic analysis of voting and policy space, we present systematic, quantitative evidence that 
probes, and confirms, the effect of policy on politics and that illuminates the period’s important 
shifts in the impact of party and region.  We investigate both legislator parameters—the 
dimensions of voting space—and roll call parameters—the dimensions of policy space and 
discover strong confirmation of the independent impact of the substance of policy on the political 
decisions of legislators, and we detect an issue-specific concatenation of party and region that 
altered over the course of the period.  This discovery of changing coalitions over this time period 
accompanied by shifts to the substance of the policy space almost certainly is marked by the 
reciprocal causation alluded to in the original policy and politics congressional literature.  In this 
configuration, it is clear that the effect of policy on politics and simultaneous changes in voting 
and policy space are not coincidental.  More specifically, we find that: 
(1) From year to year, individual legislator preferences do not change very much.  There is much 
short-term stability.  Yet both as new members enter Congress and especially as historical 
circumstances alter and different issues come to the fore with the effect of changing the 
content of voting space, the ideal positions of legislators, new and old, alter.  Variations in 
subject matter advance and sanction different, often dramatically distinct, features of roll-call 
behavior.  Over time, the constellation of preferences does change and different coalitions 
form in Congress. 
(2) The changing preferences of representatives cannot be represented by one dimension alone.  




(3) The policy content of the dimensions changes over time.  In addition (more tentatively), it 
may not be the case that economic policies always load on the first dimension and issues of 
race on the second.  We discover at least one candidate (the 81st House) as this kind of 
exception to the general rule.  Treading carefully in interpreting the substantive content of 
factor loadings, we find it plausible that even in the same historical epoch the substantive 
content of the first dimension might change from one Congress to the next either in subtle 
ways depending on which policies come to the fore as agendas alter, or, more radically, when 
the most basic content defining issue space itself can vary.   
 
II. Coding Roll Calls to Study Public Policy  
These relationships cannot be observed, of course, without being able to parse policy into 
meaningful discrete categories, a task we have undertaken.  Such a classification is a necessary 
step, of course, to understand cleavages among party and region in Congress by policy area.  To 
investigate whether and how policy makes politics we have constructed a data set based on all roll 
calls in our period that allows us to identify legislation by policy category.  Though we report 
here only on the House, we have coded all roll calls (5,252)—2,168 for the House and 3,084 for 
the Senate—from the 72nd Congress elected in 1930 through the 83rd Congress elected in 1952.3  
(See Table 1).   
In this effort, we are extending such prior analyses as those by Clausen and Cheney (1970) to 
demonstrate the distinct existence and effects of economic and social welfare policy dimensions 
(hypothesizing the former is influenced more by partisan differences and the latter by 
constituency constraints) or by Sinclair (1978) to show how policy content affected a shift from 
partisan to regional voting between 1933 to 1956.  These works rely on Clausen’s five-tier policy 
coding.  Unfortunately, this approach aggregates excessively, making it difficult, at times 
impossible, to specify the independent impact of important policy differences. (Clausen 1973)  
By inserting labor votes inside the category of social welfare, for example, the scheme obscures 
the distinctiveness of roll call behavior in this policy domain (Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder 
1993; Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 111), thus, for example, making suspect the findings in Clausen 
and Cheney (1970) that lump them together under the this single banner.  Other extant approaches 
to coding err on the other side, amounting to long inductive lists.  Poole and Rosenthal’s coding 
                                                 
3 An analysis of the Senate roll calls in planned for a subsequent paper. Our coding procedure was as 
follows.  After reading the ICPSR codebook description, we looked up each roll call in the Congressional 
Record and cross-checked the description in the codebook.  While ICPSR descriptions often were accurate, 
there were multiple instances when this description was insufficient for a policy coding.  For example, for 
votes on amendments, the amendments were for the most part undefined in the codebooks and only the CR 
could provide information on the substantive policy.  Given the description of the vote in the codebook and 
CR, we coded each roll call according to our coding scheme.  The sequence of the coding followed the 
coding scheme.  First, we coded by the first tier.  The second tier then was selected from the subset of the 
first tier.  And, finally, the third tier was chosen from the subset of the second tier.  For example, a vote on 
adding one District Court would first be coded as organization and scope since it pertains directly to the 
organization and scope of the government.  The second tier would then most appropriately be government 
organization, and the third tier, judiciary.   To ensure that our coding scheme is robust, we have begun to 
conduct inter-coder reliability tests.  Specifically, to date, one research assistant, who had not coded before, 
independently coded a 10% sample of all roll calls coded, a total 525 votes.  Comparing the two sets of 
coded roll calls, there was 82.3% agreement.  A research team of 5 followed-up by discussing 
disagreements and ambiguities, reached consensus about particular coding decisions, and then applied the 





scheme’s extensive but unsorted inventory of policies, as an instance, yields such anomalies as 
categories for World War I and the Korean War but not for World War II, and an oddly non-
equivalent set of classifications, placing ‘Mediterranean pirates,’ ‘slavery,’ and ‘public works’ on 
the same scale.  (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997: 259-262)   
Instead, we code congressional roll calls by policy area guided by visible criteria for the 
assemblage of categories.  The approach we have adopted (see Appendix 1) is detailed enough to 
discriminate clusters of policy, avoiding problems of overaggregation, yet not so lengthy as to 
cease to be based on clear categorizations.  The coding scheme thus provides policy 
classifications that can be applied and combined at different levels of aggregation, thus avoiding 
the pitfalls of approaches that either are too broad or too detailed and unwieldy.  We arrange 
policies in three layered tiers, each, in turn, more differentiated than the prior level.  The first tier 
incorporates broad categories, including sovereignty, the very existence, boundaries, and 
membership of the national regime; organization and scope, encompassing the regime’s formal 
and informal institutions, terms of participation, and substantive reach; and the more familiar 
categories of international relations and domestic affairs.  Each of these large classes further is 
divided into a subset (organization and scope, for example, is partitioned into three second tier 
categories:  government organization, representation, and constitutional amendments).  Each 
second tier category, in turn, is elaborated in fine-grained detail in a third tier of policy 
distinctions.  Thus, as an illustration, government organization at this level includes 
congressional organization, executive organization, impeachment/misconduct, and judiciary.   
This approach to policy coding assigns a discrete policy code for each roll call in each tier.   
 Our data set was constructed by applying this approach to classification.  Table 2 lists the 
number of roll calls coded for a given subset of policies.  One notable pattern is that government 
organization, a centerpiece issue in the 1930s and 1940s, is prevalent throughout the period.  A 
second is how long civil rights questions were kept off the agenda, not making it to the floor of 
the House until the late 1930s.  Third, while defense, geopolitics, and international political 
economy votes come up throughout the period, we see the expected distinct increase in the early 
1940s, one maintained throughout the remained of the decade into the Cold War.  Finally, 
infrastructure/public works, public-works employment, and social insurance are strongly 
prevalent during the early 1930s, as we would expect in the early years of the Depression and the 
start of the New Deal.  Broadly, then, the sorting achieved by our coding is consistent with the 
huge historiography on the New Deal concerning when we should expect certain policies to be 
prevalent on the agenda in Congress.   
 
III. Voting Space 
Empirical research on Congress, especially the bulk of estimation and application of spatial 
voting models, often requires a measure of the ideal points or preference parameters of members.  
Our research estimates rankings of policy space along with preference scores for members of 
Congress.   We have estimated the ideal points for each legislator using principal component 
analysis.  We utilize Heckman and Snyder’s linear scaling method (essentially factor loadings) 
they substitute for Poole and Rosenthal’s non-linear NOMINATE model, which, they argue, 
better allows for “formal methods for determining the effective dimensionality or rank of the [roll 
call] attribute space.” (Heckman and Snyder 1997: 143)  Complicating this debate about method 
is the work of Clinton and Meirowitz (forthcoming) showing that existing preference estimation 
procedures do not fully incorporate the full structure of spatial voting models.  Here, though, we 




Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores are superior, especially as both methods produce 
preference parameters that usually correlate at an extremely high level.  In our Congresses, in any 
event, the linear estimation of ideal points is highly correlated with Poole and Rosenthal’s 
NOMINATE (DW) scores.  As Table 3 indicates, the correlations for the first dimension are all 
above 0.90.  The correlations on the second dimension are lower, but still hover around 0.80.4  
During the course of our period, the preferences of legislators proved quite stable from one 
Congress to the next.  The findings reported in Table 4 presenting the correlations of ideal points 
in consecutive Congresses show all correlations on the first dimension to be above 0.93 indicating 
that with respect to the primary dimension member preferences did not change considerably 
(though the second dimension is not as highly correlated, the pairs still average 0.74).  These 
results are consistent with other studies which also discover that members tend not to change the 
basis of their vote choice over the course of their congressional careers.  (Poole 1998)   
As it turns out, though, this pattern of short-term stability is consistent with important 
considerable shifts to the composition of legislator ideal points over time either because new 
members change the overall pattern or because the ideal positions of individual member may 
change within the voting space across time as the result of a number of potential mechanisms.  
These may include shifts in district composition as the result of redistricting, changing party 
strategies or, transformations to the policy agenda.  It is the latter that interests us most here.  
Consider, as an example, the issue of civil rights Poole and Rosenthal rightly identify as crucial to 
the emergence of southern Democrats as a semi-autonomous voting bloc.   During the 1930s, the 
Democratic party managed its strange bedfellows coalition of northern immigrant, ethnic, urban, 
and labor supporters linked to southern, native, Protestant, rural, voters in an age of Jim Crow and 
exclusion of blacks from the franchise by keeping civil rights legislation off the agenda and by 
excluding farm workers and maids, key categories of black workers, from every major piece of 
New Deal legislation, including the Wagner Act, Social Security, and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.  During the Second World War, this equilibrium was disturbed by demographic shifts that 
began to make African-Americans a significant voting bloc outside the South for the first time, by 
successful labor organizing conducted both by the AFL and CIO in the South, often on a 
multiracial basis, by the earliest victories on behalf of fair employment in war production 
achieved by a nascent civil rights movement, by the extension of absentee voting rights to 
soldiers of all races fighting overseas in what still was a segregated military, and by the Supreme 
Court decision in 1944 to outlaw the white primary.  As the racial status quo began to be 
dislodged with the coming to the fore of civil rights issues, members from the Jim Crow South, 
unwilling to adjust their ideal points, increasingly were at odds with fellow Democrats.  The 
result of this shift was the emergence effectively of a three-party Congress composed of southern 
Democrats, non-southern Democrats, and Republicans who did not align exclusively in a one-
dimensional voting space.   
We can discern this process of separation and the autonomous emergence of a southern 
Democratic bloc in Figures 1 to 12 that visually represent ideal point plots of legislators on the 
first and second dimension for the 72nd  through the 83d House.5  At the start of this period until 
the end of Roosevelt’s first term, the Democrats can be seen to cluster together on the left side of 
the voting space while the Republicans occupy the right.   By the 75th, 76th, and 77th House, 
                                                 
4 Clinton and Meirowitz's ideal points correlate at the .80 level or higher both with NOMINATE and with 
Heckman and Snyder’s factor analysis.   
 






elected in the last three elections before American participation in the Second World War, 
southern Democrats clearly are partially removed from their nonsouthern colleagues, now 
concentrated at the top of the second dimension (a period, we will see, when labor votes were 
second, not first, dimension issues, since for southern members they were concerned with the 
heart of the political economy of segregation).  Still, southern and northern members remained 
aligned on the first dimension, clearly distinct from Republicans.  Subsequently, however, 
southern members not only can be observed to move away from nonsouthern Democrats on the 
second dimension, but they noticeably also are in motion along the first dimension in the 
conservative direction.  By the 82nd House, the last during the presidency of Harry Truman, the 
three groupings had become distinct party-like clusters, forming a triangle of preferences.  
Southern Democrats now were at odds both from nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans on the 
second dimension.  At the same time, while nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans were 
aligned on the second dimension, they were divided on the first.6   
This transformation to dimensionality and partisanship under the impact of changes to the policy 
universe thus was more extended temporally and substantively than Poole and Rosenthal indicate.  
More generally, the development of what, in effect, was a three-party system makes it clear that 
congressional voting space cannot be represented as if the first dimension is always regnant or 
without close investigation of the second, or higher, dimensions in a manner closely in tune with 
an understanding of historical developments.   At the same time, it cautions historians that their 
objects of analysis should be more substantively fine-grained and more temporally and 
institutionally precise.   
 
IV. Policy Space 
A powerful way to move in this direction is to examine the dimensionality of policy space not 
only by asking how many dimensions are necessary to define it but by also utilizing a detailed 
policy coding scheme like the one we have developed to provide a substantive interpretation of 
the content of the roll call parameters.    
To identify the number of dimensions of the policy space, we first calculated the factor loadings 
without any restrictions on the number of factors, essentially allowing the program to choose the 
number of parameters.  Table 5 lists the up to the first six eigenvalues when calculated for each 
Congress along with the proportion of the variance explained by each new dimension.  While the 
number of dimensions estimated for various Congresses ranged from a high of 14 to a low of 2, 
we kept only the number of dimensions that explain at least 10 per cent of the variance (this 
number is somewhat ad hoc, picked because it is possible that some of the variance being 
explained by higher dimensions is the result of error, but by placing the threshold here we can be 
reasonably assured something real is going on).   
The results are striking.  In only two Congresses, the 76th and 79th, is over 80 per cent of the 
variance accounted for by the first dimension, and even in these outlier instances a strong second 
dimension is present in the policy space.  The 77th and 81st also were characterized only by two 
parameters above our 10 per cent threshold, but the second dimension does much more of the 
work.  And in the remaining seven Congresses—the 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 78th, 80th, 82nd, and 
83rd—three dimensions were significantly present.  Of course, these findings open up more 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, with the results of the 1952 election, southern Democrats temporarily moved back toward 





questions than they answer, providing us with a much more variegated puzzle than Poole and 
Rosenthal’s leaner portrayal or Heckman and Snyder’s more plentiful one.  Once again, these 
results strongly indicate that both temporality and policy content matter a great deal, in ways we 
now can begin to try to understand.7 
In order to identify the substantive content of the policy space, we reestimated the factor loadings 
along with rotated factors (orthogonal).  These loadings, as they match up to roll call votes, then 
are used to identify the types of policies that characterize each dimension.  In order to make this 
connection between high factor loadings on a given dimension and the substance of the policy, 
we have constructed a data set that allows us to identify legislation by policy category.  The 
results are reported in Table 6, a first-cut effort to match policy content to factor scores in order to 
identify the policy content of these dimensions.  We proceeded by identifying the roll calls that 
scored high on the dimensions above our threshold of 10 per cent, and, for each group, matched 
them with our substantive coding (utilizing our most detailed level, the third tier codings).  This 
method allowed us to systematically identify each dimension, taking advantage of independently 
coded roll calls. 
There is quite a range of relationships between the policy content of congressional roll calls and 
the dimensionality of voting behavior by members.  Three features stand out most prominently to 
challenge future scholarship.  First, only in about half the issues can roll call behavior be 
accounted for exclusively by the dominant first dimension.  The other policy areas either require 
two parameters or load high on the second or third dimension.  Second, there is a good deal of 
variation both in the issues coming to the fore and in the relative dimensional coherence of 
different Congresses.  Underneath aggregate patterns of behavior lies a great diversity defined by 
variation both in time and substance.  Third, though there is a high consistency in the way a given 
issues loads from one Congress to another, there are interesting instances where the meaning of a 
particular policy area appears to vary (as examples, immigration issues appear regularly as a 
second dimension question, but once as a third dimension issue; and economic regulation, in the 
first three New Deal Congresses, appears, respectively, as a combination of the first and third, the 
second and first, and the third dimension).  At minimum, such findings are guides to much more 
finely distinguished analysis both by political scientists and historians than has been possible 
heretofore.  
 
                                                 
7 In addition to the amount of variance explained by each factor, we also have calculated the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC).  This test shows that increasing the number of dimensions improves the fit of 
the model.  Furthermore, the improvement in fit, from one dimension to the next, does not drop off 
significantly after the first dimension.  In fact, for many Congresses, the fit improves considerably from one 
to two dimensions as well as from two to three dimensions.  These findings provide support for the 
argument that a unidimensional policy space is not sufficient, while a more than three-dimensional policy 
space does not provide a good fit for the New Deal-Fair Deal Congresses.   
 
Although Heckman and Snyder claim that Poole and Rosenthal rely upon “ad hoc” measures to test for  
dimensionality, we believe that no single test is sufficient evidence to determine the attribute space of roll 
call voting.  Methods such as proportional reduction in error (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) and formal 
statistical tests, which produce "rigorous statistical criterion for estimating the rank of the model" 
(Heckman and Snyder 199: 157) all have limitations.  Thus the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) model 
which we utilize and is one of the tests proposed by Heckman and Snyder estimates nearly twice as many 
factors (7 to 8 compared to 3 to 4) for the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), they also advocate.  





V. Dimensional Content  
Overall, based on the application of factor analysis to our data, we have found that distinct groups 
of policies load high on different factors, that in most cases these patterns persist across most 
Congresses, and that in this epoch two or three (rather than one or multiple) dimensions are 
needed to account for roll call behavior.  A basic assumption commonly accepted at face value is 
that the first dimension represents party and ideology while the second connotes region (as factor 
analysis is entirely inductive, naming of dimensions always is a coding act by researchers).  
Based on the pattern we discern in Table 6 as well as our investigation, in particular, of civil 
rights roll calls (‘African-Americans’ and ‘Voting Rights’ in Table 6), we are not convinced of 
this persistence of content throughout.  That is, we are no longer sure that the first factor can be 
described persistently in terms of party and left-right ideology.  In particular, we briefly examine 
the coalitions that formed around civil rights and how such coalitions can affect the substantive 
interpretation of the factor loadings.  Civil rights policy provides a good basis for this analysis 
since, as noted, we have quite a strong historical understanding of how such questions helped 
split the Democratic party by region, opening possibilities for nonsouthern Democrats to align 
with Republicans in opposition to southern Democrats 
To test whether this coalition is represented in voting patterns we have estimated several probit 
regressions on civil rights roll calls.  Our dependent variable is the vote on the bill.  In addition to 
a constant, we also include two independent variables: southern and nonsouthern Democrats.  We 
treat southerners as members who represent the eleven state South: the old Confederacy of 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.  Nonsouthern Democrats are members who are Democrats and 
represent constituencies in other states.  Since almost all southern legislators are Democrats, we 
do not include an interaction effect between region and Democrat.  We anticipate southern 
Democrats to vote in opposition to nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans on civil rights 
questions.   
One striking pattern immediately becomes apparent.  Contradicting the expected outcome, 
southerners and nonsouthern Democrats voted together throughout the 75th, 76th, 77th, and 78th 
Congresses.  In fact, they significantly opposed Republicans on 10 out of 13 civil rights votes.  
This is suggestive of the willingness of nonsouthern Democrats to suspend their civil rights 
preferences in order to maintain a common party front where possible with their southern 
coalition partners in the Democratic party at the time the New Deal was legislating its most 
significant domestic policy initiatives.  Strikingly, this pattern began to change in the 79th 
Congress.  While Republicans continued to oppose southern Democrats, nonsouthern Democrats 
did not vote significantly as a group in either direction.  By the 81st Congress non-southern 
Democrats and Republicans, voting together on 5 out of 9 roll calls and had begun to compose a 
civil rights coalition in opposition to southern Democrats.   
These results suggest that high first loadings on civil rights votes in the early Congresses indeed 
were the result of party line voting.  But these findings also suggest that high loadings on the first 
factor in later Congresses, particularly the 81st, may (we underscore ‘may’ since we continue to 
be both surprised and intrigued by this result) represent regional rather than party divisions.  A 
close look at the results in Table 6 matching of dimensionality and policy content for this 
Congress (one of only two where the variance in member behavior is accounted for by two 
dimensions exclusively) provides some confirmation.  We can note that whereas civil rights 
issues load on the first dimension, a host of policy questions that ordinarily are thought to be 
party/ideology issues—including the tariff, social insurance, appropriations, and fiscal policy—




This counterintuitive pattern supports the hypothesis that in this particular Congress the first 
dimension in fact denotes region rather than party.  Even if, as we believe, this inversion in 
content is contained in this single instance, there is a more general lesson to be learned.  When, 
and if, comparable patterns emerge in roll call data, scholars must take care to be very cautious 
when interpreting the substantive meaning of particular factor loadings.   
 
VI. Concluding Coda 
 We trust we have shown not only that it is possible to find our way back to the question 
of whether, and how, policy makes politics, but what the payoffs might look like.  We have 
demonstrated that the subject can be revived by moving beyond two impediments: the absence of 
usable coding schemes with which to organize the universe of public policy issues considered by 
Congress and the tendency to aggregate roll calls without attention to policy, thus leading to 
broadly general conclusions about voting dimensionality which, while accurate, also can manage 
to be misleading.   
 Clearing away these barriers, we have discerned changes to patterns of roll call behavior 
from the 1930s to the early 1950s that complement but move beyond familiar portraits of the 
stability in the behavior of legislators.  We have found important variations over time both to the 
content of voting space and the ideal positions of individual legislators.  We have ascertained that 
two, sometimes three, but not fewer or more dimensions are required to capture most of the 
variation in legislative voting behavior.  We have identified shifts from Congress to Congress in 
the intersection of policy content and the dimensionality of member voting.  And, more 
tentatively, we have raised questions about the continuity of the content defining the dimensions 
of policy voting.    
Proceeding by joining a historical and substantive sensibility to analytical studies of Congress, we 
have attempted, in short, to move beyond the too limited (and, to our taste, too ahistorical) debate 
about one dimension or many to more precise and focused questions about the manner in which 
history and policy content matter to fundamental issues in political representation.  We conclude, 
most broadly, that yes, policy does make politics, but not in ways that either are obvious or 
necessarily persist across time.  If the substance of policy matters, so, too, does policy history in a 
manner far more fine-grained and challenging than most scholars of Congress (or historians) have 
yet to credit or take into account.  Clearly, there is much work that systematic students of 
congressional behavior, political historians, and students of American political development 
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Table 1:  Number of Roll calls Coded by Congress 
Congress: 72nd 73rd 74th 75th 76th 77th 78th 79th 80th 81st 82nd 83rd 
House 123 143 212 158 227 152 156 231 163 275 181 147 
Senate 280 228 193 174 266 192 220 244 248 455 313 271 
 
Table 2:  Frequency of Roll calls in the House Coded by Policy Area (Sub-set of Policies) 
Congress: 72nd 73rd 74th 75th 76th 77th 78th 79th 80th 81st 82nd 83rd 
Civil Rights 0 0 0 4 2 3 3 4 1 9 0 0 
Gov’t Org. 18 13 17 22 22 5 19 20 14 23 19 15 
Defense 5 1 6 3 16 26 3 17 4 10 14 3 
Geopolitics 4 6 11 4 14 13 14 13 13 30 23 13 
I.P.E. 5 3 4 3 7 1 2 8 5 13 3 5 
Farmers/Farmin
g Support 
7 10 8 7 7 9 11 3 4 8 5 6 
Infrastructure/P
ublic Works 
2 5 14 2 3 0 1 4 0 4 4 10 
Wage/Price 
Controls 
0 0 0 0 0 5 4 22 4 5 14 0 
Labor 
Markets/Unions 
0 3 0 8 10 4 2 14 6 10 3 4 
Public-Works 
Employment 
2 4 2 5 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 






Pearson Correlation:  Linear Estimation of Ideal Points and NOMINATE (DW) 
House of Representatives 
Congress 1st Dimension 2nd Dimension 
72nd  0.97 0.90 
73rd  0.96 0.41 
74th 0.97 0.44 
75th 0.97 0.77 
76th 0.97 0.85 
77th 0.94 0.90 
78th 0.97 0.94 
79th 0.97 0.94 
80th 0.91 0.83 
81st 0.95 0.94 
82nd 0.96 0.93 








Pearson Correlation:  Steadiness of Ideal Points Over Time 
House of Representatives 
Congresses 1st Dimension 2nd Dimension Number of Legislators 
72, 73 0.96 0.045 256 
73, 74 0.95 0.80 318 
74, 75 0.96 0.31 325 
75, 76 0.98 0.88 293 
76, 77 0.98 0.91 339 
77, 78 0.95 0.91 315 
78, 79 0.96 0.92 331 
79, 80 0.96 0.81 308 
80, 81 0.95 0.84 299 
81, 82 0.97 0.92 353 






Table 5:  Dimensions of the Policy Space by Congress 
Congress 72nd 73rd 74th 75th 76th 77th 
Dim.’s 
Estimated 
9 7 5 5 2 4 
Dim.’s Selected 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Dimension Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion 
 1 37.27 0.34 65.41 0.51 109.56 0.57 66.91 0.50 138.50 0.84 57.94 0.59 
 2 23.20 0.21 19.97 0.15 33.47 0.17 34.58 0.26 25.49 0.15 22.17 0.22 
 3 11.08 0.10 13.15 0.10 19.69 0.10 16.25 0.12   9.55 0.09 
 4 9.76 0.09 11.06 0.08 14.97 0.07 7.32 0.05   7.33 0.07 
 5 8.20 0.07 8.12 0.06 11.29 0.05 6.92 0.05     
 6 6.63 0.06 5.43 0.04         
Congress 78th 79th 80th 81st 82nd 83rd 
Dim.’s 
Estimated 
6 2 5 3 5 14 
Dim.’s Selected 3 2 3 2 3 3 
Dimension Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion Eigenvalue Proportion 
 1 61.86 0.58 102.75 0.83 51.54 0.40 118.34 0.60 84.04 0.55 38.43 0.34 
 2 17.00 0.16 20.24 0.16 33.98 0.26 72.53 0.37 27.38 0.18 17.63 0.16 
 3 11.68 0.11   26.60 0.20 4.11 0.02 18.58 0.12 11.19 0.10 
 4 7.02 0.06   8.46 0.06   12.14 0.08 6.97 0.06 
 5 4.72 0.04   6.39 0.05   8.84 0.05 6.17 0.05 
 6 2.69 0.02         5.62 0.05 
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Table 6:  Policy Content by Congress 
Congress Dimension Policy Content 
72 1 • Elections 
1931-32  • Diplomacy 
  • Trade/Tariffs 
  • Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Post-Office 
  • Monetary 
  • Military Pensions/Benefits, Public-Works Employment 
 1, 2 • Social Regulation 
 1, 3 • Business/Capital Markets 
 2, 1 • Congressional Organization, Executive Organization 
 2 • Immigration and Naturalization 
  • Civilian Health 
 2, 3 • Appropriations 
 3, 2 • Defense Organization 
 3 • Transfers 
73 1 • Territories and Colonies 
1933-34  • Congressional Organization 
  • Elections 
  • Agricultural Technology 
  • Post-Office 
  • Appropriations, Business/Capital Markets 
  • Social Insurance 
 1, 2 • Diplomacy 
  • Trade/Tariffs 
  • Infrastructure 
  • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation, Bus./Capital Markets, Monetary 
 1, 3 • Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Corporatism 
  • Economic Regulation 
 2 • Impeachment/Misconduct 
 2, 3 • Labor Markets/Unions 
 3 • Immigration and Naturalization 
74 1 • Executive Organization 
1935-36  • Diplomacy/Intelligence 
  • Tariff 
  • Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Corporatism, Infrastructure/Public Works, National Resources 
  • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation, Monetary, Business/Capital 
Markets 
  • Social Insurance, Housing, Military Pensions, Public-Works 
Employment 
  • Defense Organization 
 1, 2 • Transportation 
  • Naval Organization, Military Installations 
 2, 1 • Economic Regulation 
 3 • Groups and Interests 
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75 1 • African-Americans 
1937-38  • Executive Organization 
  • Elections 
  • Tariff 
  • Agricultural technology 
  • Transportation 
 1, 2 • National Resources 
  • Fiscal/Taxation, Labor Markets/Unions 
 1, 3 • Business/Capital Markets 
  • Housing 
 2 • Indian Removal and Compensation 
  • Congressional Organization, Judiciary 
  • Environment, Infrastructure 
  • Social Insurance, Transfers 
 2, 1 • Appropriations 
  • Public-Works Employment 
 3, 1 • Navy Organization 
  • Farmers/Farming Support 
 3 • Economic Regulation 
76 1 • Loyalty 
1939-40  • African-Americans 
  • Indian Removal and Compensation, Territories and Colonies 
  • Executive Organization, Judiciary, Impeachment/Misconduct 
  • Elections, Census/Apportionment 
  • Navy, Defense Organization 
  • Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade/Tariffs 
  • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Infrastructure, Transportation, Social Knowledge 
  • Appropriations, Monetary, Bus./Capital Markets, Fiscal/Taxation 
  • Housing, Military Pensions, Public-Works Employment 
 2, 1 • Commemorations and National Culture 
  • National Resources 
 2 • Immigration and Naturalization 
  • Congressional Organization 
  • Conscription/Enlistment 
  • Environment 
  • Labor Markets/Unions 
  • Children, Social Insurance, Transfers 
77 1 • Voting Rights 
1941-42  • Executive Organization 
  • Census/Apportionment 
  • Navy Organization 
  • Diplomacy 
  • Tariff 
  • Corporatism, Transportation 
  • Monetary, Business/Capital Markets 
 1, 2 • Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Appropriations 
 2, 1 • Economic Regulation 
 2 • Immigration and Naturalization 
 20 
 
78 1 • Voting Rights 
1943-44  • Diplomacy/Intelligence 
  • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support, Fishing and 
Livestock 
  • National Resources, Transportation, Wages and Price Controls 
  • Appropriations 
  • Housing 
 2, 1 • International Organization 
 2 • Congressional Organization, Judiciary 
  • Labor Markets/Unions 
  • Crime 
 1, 3 • Executive Organization 
  • Fiscal Taxation 
 3 • Defense Organization 
79 1 • Loyalty 
1945-46  • African-Americans, Voting Rights 
  • Judiciary 
  • Census/Apportionment 
  • Conscription, Defense Organization 
  • Diplomacy, Foreign Aid 
  • Tariff 
  • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Corporatism, Interstate Compacts/Federalism, Infrastructure, 
National Resources, Post-Office, Wage and Price Controls 
  • Appropriations, Economic Regulation 
  • Public Works Employment  
 1, 2 • Executive Organization 
  • Economic International Organizations 
  • Transportation 
  • Business/Capital Markets 
  • Social Insurance 
 1, 2 • Housing 
 2 • Immigration and Naturalization 
  • Labor Markets/Unions 
80 1 • Tariffs 
1947-48  • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support, Fishing and 
Livestock 
  • Appropriations, Business/Capital Markets, Fiscal/Taxation, 
Economic Regulation 
 1, 2 • Housing, Social Insurance 
 1, 3 • Wage and Price Controls 
 2 • Loyalty 
  • Labor Markets/Unions 




81 1 • African-Americans, Voting Rights 
1949-50  • State Admission/Union Composition 
  • Federalism and Terms of Office 
  • Conscription, Navy Organization 
  • Foreign Aid, International Organizations 
  • Post-Office, Wage and Price Controls, Social Knowledge 
 1, 2 • Congressional Organization 
  • Labor Markets/Unions, Economic Regulation 
  • Housing, Military Pensions/Benefits 
  • Diplomacy 
 2, 1 • Indian Removal and Compensation 
  • Infrastructure, National Resources 
 2 • Commemorations and National Culture 
  • Executive Organization, Judiciary 
  • Groups and Interests 
  • Defense Organization 
  • Tariff 
  • Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Transportation 
  • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation 
  • Disaster, Education, Social Insurance 
82 1 • Executive Organization, Judiciary 
1951-52  • Defense Organization 
  • Foreign Aid 
  • Agricultural Technology 
  • Environment, Infrastructure/Public Works, National Resources 
  • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation 
  • Housing 
  • Diplomacy/Intelligence 
 1, 2 • Wage and Price Controls 
  • Trade/Tariffs 
 2, 1 • Farmers/Farming Support 
 2 • Immigration and Naturalization 
 2, 3 • Congressional Organization 
  • Labor Markets/Unions 
83 1 • Congressional Organization, Executive Organization 
1953-54  • Air Force Organization 
  • Infrastructure 
  • Fiscal/Taxation, Economic Regulation 
  • Education, Military Pensions 
 1, 2 • Farmers/Farming Support 
  • Appropriations, Business/Capital Markets 
 1, 3 • Tariffs 
  • Labor Markets/Unions 
 2, 1 • Social Insurance 
 2 • Interstate Compacts/Federalism 
  • Housing 






































































































































































































































































Appendix 1:  Policy Classification by Levels 
  
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
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(Groups and interests) 
 
(Federalism and terms of 
office) 
















































































(14) Social Policy: 
(Agricultural technology) 
(Farmers/Farming Support)  
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